In the name of Allah
the most
Compassionate and Merciful

In the name of Allah,

the most merciful, the most compassionate.

The victory of the Islamic Revolution shocked the East and the West, so that U.S. became frustrated with the failure of its intelligence apparatus in deterring revolutions. Despite its sophisticated methods, extensive resources and huge amount of accumulated experience, the C.I.A. failed to render a timely and correct analysis on the growth of the Islamic Revolution, its organization, leadership, and how it influenced the masses. The unmatched unity of our nation and their faith in victory, under the leadership of the Imam, provided the world with a unique pattern on bringing about an Islamic Revolution.

After the victory of the Islamic Revolution, the Americans decided to correct their points of weakness, since their official sources including military and civilian officials of the former regime had lost their capabilities. Others like the Liberation Movement members who provided the U.S. wittingly or not, with all kinds of information in their official and unofficial meetings, were not able to satisfy the intelligence needs of the Americans.

Their growing enmity with Islam and the Islamic Revolution compelled them to hatch plots as a countermeasure, which in turn necessitated access to full and basic information on the integrity of the Revolution.

The counter-revolutionary forces move on to gain a better understanding of the social,economic,political and ideological gaps that may exist in revolutionary ranks. This pattern is not confined to counterrevolutionary forces in Iran, but all throughout the world popular movements face similar plots which aim at the following objectives:

A) Identifying revolutionary figures and those who have entered their ranks with unrevolutionary attitudes.

B) Use of all related information in their plots and conspiracies to divert the direction of a revolution. Western oriented figures are considered as the main hopes in this effort, and heavy investments are made for them to occupy key revolutionary positions.

C) Use of information in forcefully countering a revolution, which include: overthrow, military agression and the assassination of revolutionary leaders.

D) Providing information to the political allies of the power whose interests are threatened. Similarity of interests and political goals in most cases urges the formation of an alliance of various countries and powers, to bring about a co-ordination which is essential in carrying out any common plot against a revolution. They exchange information in order to strengthen their co-ordination.

A document included in this book explains the issue clearly. It concerns the report of a briefing session held by C.I.A analysts for a Zeev Aloon, MOSAD " Israeli Espionage Service " representative in C.I.A.

The close affiliation of MOSAD and C.I.A and their common espionage objectives in collecting information on the Palestinian revolution eliminates differences that may not only exist between America and Israel but also between their intelligence agencies, to enable them to function as one organization in carrying out a co-ordinated program.

Discovering, identifying and hiring of an information source within an organization are the most important and effective C.I.A measures, and the agency applies all sophisticated methods in this connection.

Usually other spies and sources identify a potential source, while necessary actions are taken to hire him only after full investigation is conducted on his personal background.
The agency pays a lot of attention to certain personal characteristics that compell the individual to collaborate with those whom he used to look at as his staunch enemies at one time.these characteristics are as follows:

1. Common political positions usually are the most important cause of their collaboration with C.I.A.they consent to act as a spy and an information source for the C.I.A due to their faith in the western political system and culture.Amir Entezam and Moghaddam Maraghei (see books No 10 and 24 of our publications) fall in this category, because they voluntarily placed all information at the disposal of the Central Intelligence Agency.

2. Ideological frustration: Those who find unattended flows in the ideological approach of their respective organizations gradually become attracted to the opposition pole. Many of the C.I.A sources are the former hardline communists who were employed by the Agency, after their frustration with their own school of thought.

3. Financial needs: Financial needs sometimes urge an individual to volunteer for espionage. While approaching their sources, even those who are not in financial needs, C.I.A. officials provide them with gifts or wages in order to insure their collaboration.

Although the above points do not include all techniques exploited by intelligence agencies,they provide the basis for the introduction of the present book titled " Palestine- (3) "

Book No. 44: PALESTINE (3)

This book contains documents related with a C.I.A operation aimed at collecting intelligence from within the Islamic Revolution. The main agent of this operation is unidentified, but the Centeral Intelligence Agency reffers to him as " M.G.Barge/1 " or " B/1 ". The documents generally include following information on him:

1. Membership in Fatah Organization: B/1 is a high ranking Fatah official, being perhaps the main reason for the C.I.A's attempt to hire him. He is also an expert on military training. According to a document: " B/1 and M/1 are in a position to be aware of all Fatah military training."

M/1 is another spy code named " M.G.Martyr/1 " whose connection with B/1 will be explained in other sections.

2. The documents do not state when he was hired by the C.I.A, but reports indicate that he must have been a long time hireling. It should also be noted that the substantial part of these documents deal with Barge's activities in Iran,therefore his reports in other fields are not available at the Tehran intelligence collecting station.

3. How " Barge " came to Iran: following the victory of the Islamic Revolution,Islamic Republic's support for the Palestinian Revolution paved the way for a serious co-operation between the Islamic Revolution and the Palestinian Liberation Organization. Thus a PLO delegation arrived in Iran to provide the Islamic Revolution Guards corps with the essential military training. Barge was a high ranking member and probably the head of the delegation.

4. According to another document Barge is seriously anti-communist, but no clue is given as to the reason for his opposition or attitude. This, however, has been an effective factor in his collaboration with C.I.A.

5. Barge's salary prior to May 22 , 1979 was about 2000 lebanese Lira, but the Centeral Intelligence Agency considered his financial problems and increased his salary to 4000 lebanese Lira which is equal to Rials 100,000.

6. Although Iran was his main area of operation in 1979, the C.I.A station in Tehran was not responsible for establi_ shing contacts with him. but due to the sensitivity of his connections with the agency, Beirut station got in touch with him through a third party, code-named " M.G.Martyr/1 ". In his contacts, M/1 would receive the code-written messages from B/1 and later submit them personally to the C.I.A officials.

7. Because of his critical mission and his membership in Fatah, B/1 was also in contact with the Palestinian Embassy in Tehran.

8. B/1's work facilitated his contacts with different C.I.A sections for which he collected information. A glance at the documents indicate that the collected information are usually on the following issues:

A-Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, its organization,number of personel,arms,training,its significant figures, and finally the social and geographical strata the Guards belong to.

Since the Guards Corps comprises the front liners of the Islamic Revolution in confronting the counter-revolutionaries, all other forces intending to attack or counter the revolution, find the Corps " Sepah " as a consolidated embankment before them. therefore, in the first instance, they must collect basic information about the Guards Corps.

C.I.A, as the main intelligence front for the foreign based counter-revolution launched an operation to gain necessary knowledge on this newly established revolutionary institution, through Barge's good contacts with the Guards Corps.

Based on the exchanged information, one must admit that Barge's lack of intelligence, his unfamiliarity with the culture and attitude of the muslim revolutionaries,and lack of correct guidance from the C.I.A did not bring the success C.I.A expected to have through him.

B. Power system and sovereignty in Iran: Differences between the Imam and the provisional government, and the important clergymen's attitude towards the leader of the Islamic Revolution.

The newly established structure of the Islamic Republic,the unique leadership of the Imam which endowed it with the gift of stability, and the surprising spread of it outside the Iranian borders were always the main source of confusion for those who intended to analyse the revolution.

These factors on the one hand, and the unrivalled unity of our nation in the areana of their struggle for victory forced the anti-revolutionary plotters to revise their standard and out-dated conspiracies. C.I.A analysts, therefore, appealed to individuals like Barge, to have access to basic and essential information on the revolutionary circles. But C.I.A did not gain much in this field either, because Barge did not approach events dynamically.

C. A general situation report on Iran, the revolution, Khuzestan-related issues, and Kurdistan situation.

Excluding the Khuzestan issues on which Barge could have a positive operation due to his contacts with the PLO office in that province, Other reports included in this part were nothing but routine agenda for B/1. Because all C.I.A agents must dispatch their comments on the environment, and the activities that take place around them. Even these comments reflect Barge's personal understanding and are plagued with numberless deficiencies.

The only case in which Barge rendered an interesting analysis was his report on Tudeh Party, the reason being his anti-communist attitude.

Overview

As stated in the above, this book is about the operations of a PLO, Fatah member for the Central Intelligence Agency of America.

If Brage's espionage operations, and his position in P.L.O. are scrutinized carefully, one would wonder why he did all this. Why should he pretend to be struggling against Zionism and its advocate U.S.A, but in reality act as a direct spy for America and an indirect one for Zionism?
Is Zionism not the main enemy of the Palestinian nation and a usurper of their Lands?

The introduction of the book No. 42 titled Palestine (1) and its documents reflected the P.L.O functions and the prevailing attitude of its leadership.

Reliance on political games,foreign dependence,aimlessness and the absurd attempts of individuals and groups ruling over P.L.O forced the organization to invest on political maneuvers and to follow the same politics as those of the reactionary Arab regimes, instead of fighting the enemies of the Palestinian nation directly.

These groups will inflict a detrimental blow on the Quds librating revolution. The C.I.A infiltration and the existence of agents such as Barge in the top decision-making echelons of these same Palestinian groups are the unquestionable results of the absence of an Islamic faith in the P.L.O's leadership hierarchy.

The Palestinian moslem revolutionaries must make a basic revision on groups that are acting as their representatives, otherwise, these same groups will further produce traitor elements like Barge and Martyr.

In the recent years, the activities of the above-mentioned elements have had a negative impact on the Palestinian revolution, and the following cases indicate that the revolution is being forced to make compromises:

- Abandonment of an armed struggle for political moves;
- Lack of a decisive stand against the Camp David conspiracy, and engaging, instead, in political rhetoric as the sole countermeasure;

Accepting the Fahad Plan as an implicit acceptance of the Camp David conspiracy;

Holding direct talks with U.S. puppets such as king Hossain on the formation of a joint Jordano-Palestinian confedration;

Evacuating Beirut and leaving it to the Zionist front;

Establishing close ties with the Egyption regime which has signed Camp David accords;

Launching all efforts to facilitate the return of Egypt to the Islamic fold;

Opposing the progressive frontline states;

By looking at the vague future based on these efforts, the Palestinian nation will certainly feel disappointed, but Almighty-Allah's promise for help will undoubtedly come true, and the brave sons and the unknown herose of Palestine will finally launch their real struggle, which is according to our Imam based on "the use of machine-guns that are only dependent on faith" may we witness the final victory of Islam.

Moslem students following the
line of the Imam.





...T/SECRET
...THEY WILL HAVE MORTARS, BUT ONLY UP TO 82 MM - NO
...THEY WILL HAVE 12.7 MM
...TANK WEAPONS WILL BE PGM'S. THEY WILL HAVE RPG'S, PLUS STREET FIGHTING.
...TRAINING IS FOR THESE WEAPONS. PLUS STREET FIGHTING.
...HAVE MORE ON THE TRAINING AT A LATER DATE.)

...KHOMEYNI/1 ALSO SAID THAT KHOMEYNI IS KEEPING DIRECT CONTROL
...LY OVER THE REPUBLICAN GUARD, BUT ALSO OVER THE AIR FORCE.
...NAVY, IS UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT.

...REQUIREMENTS REF C, PLUS THOSE IN DIRECTOR 435166, WERE
...D TO KHOMEYNI/1 FOR PASSAGE TO MUBARGE/1. WE HAD TRANSLATED
...INTO ARABIC.

4. FILES: 221-946977, 221-92145/1. RVW 11MAY99 RVW DOC, I ALL CRFT
...C/SECRET



...SECRET 221822Z MAY 79 STAFF

...CITE BEIRUT 53948

TO: DIRECTOR, TEHRAN.

...WHITEL INTEL ARJUICE MUBARGE)

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 38861
B. TEHRAN 53328

1. IN LAST MEETING WITH MUBARGE/1 (B/1) WE WENT OV...
REQUIREMENTS POSED IN REFS. HE WILL ENDEAVOR TO OBTAIN...
INFORMATION ON THOSE HE COULD NOT ANSWER.

2. WHAT ARE THE LOCATIONS OF THE PLO TRAINING SITE...
THE PLO TRAINING TEAM IS CURRENTLY CONDUCTING TRAINING...
THE 'ABBASABAD ARMY CAMP. THIS LOCATION IS ONLY TEMPOR...
HOWEVER, AND B/1 EXPECTS THE PRIMARY TRAINING SITE TO...
MOVED TO AN AS YET UNDETERMINED LOCATION SOMETIME IN T...

3. WHAT IS THE FUNCTION OF PLO OFFICE IN AHVAZ, ...
KHUZESTAN? B/1 DOES NOT KNOW THE EXACT FUNCTION OF THIS...
OFFICE. B/1 ALSO DOES NOT KNOW WHAT SPECIFIC AFFILIATION...
THE OFFICE IS ENGAGED IN OR HOW MANY PALESTINIANS HAVE...
BEEN SENT THERE. B/1 COULD ONLY MAKE GENERAL COMMENTS...
PALESTINIAN ACTIVITIES IN KHUZESTAN, SAYING THEY WERE...
PLAYING A "GOOD ROLE." IN GENERAL, B/1 SAID THAT PALES...
EFFORTS IN KHUZESTAN HAD BEEN TO ACT AS A MEDIATOR BETW...
THE PEOPLE ON ONE SIDE AND KHOMEINI AND THE GOVERNMENT...
ON THE OTHER. THE OBJECTIVE OF THE PALESTINIAN EFFORTS...
WAS TO KEEP THE SITUATION IN KHUZESTAN FROM BLOWING UP...
B/1 DOUBTED THAT ANY EFFORTS WERE BEING MADE IN KHUZESTAN...
TO GAIN IRANIAN ADHERENTS FOR FIGHTING IN PALESTINE...
IN ANY CASE, B/1 KNEW OF NONE. HOWEVER, ACCORDING TO...
B/1, "LARGE" NUMBERS OF IRANIANS HAVE APPROACHED THE PLO...
OFFICE IN TEHRAN VOLUNTEERING TO GO TO PALESTINE TO FIGHT...
THESE HAVE ALL BEEN REGISTERED, BUT THERE ARE NO CURRENT...
PLANS TO SEND THEM TO PALESTINE, CONTINGENCY PLANNING...

FOR THEIR USE. HOWEVER, IS BEING MADE BY THE PLO. B/I REITERATED THAT THERE WAS NO ACTIVE PLO EFFORT THAT HE KNEW OF IN IRAN TO RECRUIT FIGHTERS. KHOMEINI HAS OFFERED OTHER SUPPORT (NFD) TO THE PALESTINIANS, BUT ARAFAT HAS NOT ACCEPTED. B/I HAS NOT DETAILS ON THIS. B/I DID SAY THAT HANI AL-HASAN HAD ACTIVELY LOBBIED WITH KHOMEINI TO CUT DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH EGYPT.

4. B/I COULD NOT REALLY COMMENT ON YAZDI'S APPOINTMENT AS FOREIGN MINISTER. B/I DID SAY THAT YAZDI WAS CLOSE TO BAZARGAN, WHO, IN TURN, HAD BEEN A GOOD FRIEND OF PRIME MINISTER BAKTIAR; NONE OF WHOM WERE POPULAR WITH THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS.

5. B/I SAID THAT IN THE OPINION OF THE GOVERNMENT/ RELIGIOUS FIGURES MOTAHARI'S ASSASSINS WERE EITHER FORMER MEMBERS OF SAVAK OR COMMUNISTS. B/I, HOWEVER, KNEW OF NO HARD INFORMATION ON THEIR IDENTITIES. HE DID SAY THAT THE GOVERNMENT/KHOMEINI PLANNED "CRACK DOWN" (NFD) ON THESE GROUPS.

6. B/I SAYS THAT THERE ARE SOME SERIOUS DIFFERENCES BETWEEN KHOMEINI AND BAZARGAN, BUT THAT HE (S/) DID NOT KNOW THE EXTENT OF THESE DIFFERENCES. ONE OF THE PRIMARY DIFFERENCES, HOWEVER, WAS OVER THE PRESENCE, USE, AND INFLUENCE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS AND THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES. BAZARGAN WANTED TO ELIMINATE THESE AS THE GOVERNMENT WAS PRACTICALLY POWERLESS. KHOMEINI, HOWEVER, WOULD NOT BOW TO BAZARGAN ON THIS. ALSO, B/I SAID THAT BAZARGAN WANTS TO DECREASE THE PLO'S INFLUENCE WITHIN THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS AND ON KHOMEINI. BAZARGAN ALSO WANTS TO GIVE THE ARMY A MORE IMPORTANT ROLE. B/I SAYS THAT WHILE BAZARGAN IS NOT AN ARDENT PLO SUPPORTER, NEITHER IS HE AGAINST THE PLO.

7. KHOMEINI, ACCORDING TO B/I, APPEARS TO BE IN VERY GOOD HEALTH. HE APPEARS ROBUST AND STRONG. B/I BELIEVES THAT KHOMEINI WILL LIVE FOR A "LONG TIME". KHOMEINI'S DIET CONSISTS MAINLY OF MILK AND WHEAT, AND LITTLE ELSE. HE EATS VERY LITTLE MEAT.

8. B/I HAD NO INFORMATION ON AUTONOMY MOVEMENTS AMONG THE MINORITIES. B/I DID STATE THAT CURRENT PLO POLICY WAS TO FAVOR KHOMEINI AND NOT TO BACK THE MINORITIES.

9. THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS ARE NOW BEING TRAINED AT THE 'ABBASABAD COMPOUND. THERE IS ALSO SOME TRAINING CONDUCTED AT THE WAR COLLEGE. ANOTHER TRAINING AREA IS BEING PLANNED FOR MESHED, AND EVENTUALLY TRAINING SITES WILL BE ESTABLISHED THROUGHOUT IRAN, AS STATED IN PARA2. THE SITE AT THE 'ABBASABAD COMPOUND WILL SOON BE TRANSFERRED.

10. NO PLO TRAINING TEAM MEMBERS ARE AT THE GULF DISTRICT COMPOUND AND B/I DOES NOT KNOW IF CONCERNING COMPOUNDS HE HAS SEEN ('ABBASABAD). B/I STATES THAT ALL OFFICES HAVE BEEN BROKEN INTO. SOME SAFES HAVE ALSO BEEN BROKEN INTO, BUT MOST HAVE NOT. ATTEMPT USUALLY CONSISTED OF TRYING TO SHOOT OFF THE COMBINATION LOCKS. B/I WILL TRY TO FIND OUT MORE.

11. THE PLO TRAINING TEAM IS CURRENTLY HOUSED IN THREE LOCATIONS. ONE GROUP IS IN THE TAJRISH AREA, ANOTHER IS IN THE SHEMIRAN AREA, AND THE VILLA IN WHICH THE MISSION HEADQUARTERED, AND IN WHICH B/I LIVES, IS LOCATED ON FERESHTEH STREET, AT THE TOP OF JORDAN STREET.

12. B/I ALSO SAID THAT THE PLO DOES NOT AS YET HAVE ANY INFLUENCE OVER THE ASSIGNMENT OF PALESTINIAN TECHNICIANS TO WORK IN THE OIL FIELDS, BUT THAT THE PLO IS WORKING TO OBTAIN SUCH INFLUENCE. THEY EXPECT THAT KHOMEINI WILL GRANT THEM SOME SORT SAY ON THIS MATTER IN THE FUTURE.

13. WE ARE PUTTING DETAILS OF TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION OF REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS INTO SEPARATE CABLE.

14. FILE: 201-945977. RVW 20MAY99 DRV DOC.

ALL SECRET
S E C R E T

23 MAY 79 VU 42Z

S E C R E T 2223412 MAY 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 443605.

TO: IMMEDIATE BEIRUT INFO TEHRAN.

WNINTEL ARJUICE MJBARGE

REF: BEIRUT 5394?

1. PROPOSE ASSIST MJBARGE/1 IN HIS FINANCIAL [illegible] AS FOLLOWS:

A. DOUBLE HIS SALARY (RETROACTIVE TO THE TIME HE ARRIVED TEHRAN) TO LL 4,000 RPT LL 4,000 FOR THE TIME HE IS IN IRAN.

B. ADVANCE HIM THE 30,000 RIYALS (APPROX U.S. $) TO BE REPAID FROM HIS MONTHLY SALARY.

C. HAVE HIM REPAY SALARY ADVANCE FROM INCREASE WHILE IN TEHRAN, AT THE RATE OF LL 2,000 RPT LL 2,000/MO. RETURNS POS FROM TEHRAN BEFORE ADVANCE REPAID WOULD [illegible] THE TERMS FOR THE REPAYMENT OF THE BALANCE OF THE SALARY ADVANCE FROM HIS NORMAL LL 2,000/MO SALARY.

2. IF ABOVE ACCEPTABLE TO STATION AND MJBARGE/1, [illegible] HIS MOC TO REFLECT ABOVE. PLS ADVISE.

3. FILE: 201-946477. RVW 22MAY99 DDCI [illegible]

S E C R E T
BT
#2459

23 May 79 VU 42Z

S E C R E T 2309252 MAY 79 STAFF

CITE BEIRUT 53953

TO: DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN.

WNINTEL INTEL AJAJA MJBARGE

REF: DIRECTOR 435108

1. MJBARGE/1 (B/1) RESPONSES TO PARA 2 REP REQUIREMENTS, CONCERNING ACTIVITIES OF KHOMEINI SUPPORTERS IN LEBANON, ARE SET FORTH BELOW. B/1'S KNOWLEDGE ON THIS SUBJECT IS RATHER LIMITED.

2. B/1 IDENTIFIES THE "AL-AZARGAH MOVEMENT" AS BEING AN ISLAMIC MOVEMENT MADE UP OF FARSI SPEAKING FOLLOWERS OF KHOMEINI. HE COULD NOT PROVIDE INFORMATION CONCERNING ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH "AMAL" OR DETAILING ITS SUPPORT FROM KHOMEINI.

3. OTHER THAN SAYING THAT HUSAIN AL-HUSAYNI HAD A "GOOD" RELATIONSHIP WITH KHOMEINI, B/1 COULD NOT PROVIDE ANY DETAILS ON THAT RELATIONSHIP.

4. B/1 SAYS THAT KHOMEINI, AND THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, PLAN TO EXPORT THEIR REVOLUTION TO ALL MUSLIM COUNTRIES. B/1 HAS HEARD KHOMEINI SPEAK ON THE SUBJECT AND KHOMEINI HAS MENTIONED EXPORTING THE REVOLUTION NOT ONLY TO LEBANON, BUT ALSO TO IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN, INDIA, PAKISTAN, AFRICA (IN GENERAL) AND EVEN TO THE PHILIPPINES. B/1 DOES NOT KNOW KHOMEINI'S ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN LEBANON, NOR DOES HE HAVE AN IDEA AS TO THE ROLE WHICH KHOMEINI ENVISIONS FOR LEBANON'S SHIA.

5. B/1 SAID THAT THERE IS VERY LITTLE COORDINATION OF COOPERATION MILITARILY BETWEEN FATAH AND "AMAL". POLITICAL TIES ARE SLIGHTLY STRONGER, BUT ARE STILL VERY SLIGHT. B/1 SAID HE COULD NOT ESTIMATE THE STRENGTH OF "AMAL", BUT HE DID KNOW THAT IT HAD INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY SINCE THE DISAPPEARANCE OF MUSA SADR.

6. B/1 BELIEVES THAT IRANIAN SHIA ARE CONTINUALLY VISITING

PAGE 2 BEIRUT 53953 S E C R E T
LEBANON IN ORDER TO ASSESS THE SITUATION, BUT HE HAS NO DEFI
INFORMATION THAT THIS IS TRUE.

7. KHOMEINI DOES NOT HAVE ANY OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVES P
IN LEBANON, ACCORDING TO B/1. HOWEVER, LEBANESE SHIA' (B/1
HAS NO IDENTIFICATIONS) ARE REPORTING TO KHOMEINI ON THE
SITUATION IN LEBANON. THESE SHIA' COME FROM BOTH WITHIN AMA
AND FROM WITHOUT THAT ORGANIZATION.

8. KHOMEINI'S ATTITUDE TOWARD SYRIA IS NOT VERY FAVORABLE
AS HE CONSIDERS THE ALAWITES HERETICS. B/1 SAYS HE WAS TOLD
HANI AL-HASAN THAT THE PURPOSE OF ASSAD'S MID-
APRIL TRIP TO IRAN WAS TO ATTEMPT TO IMPROVE RELATIONS BETW
SYRIA AND KHOMEINI. (HASAN WAS AT THE AIRPORT TO GREET ASSAD
B/1 COULD NOT COMMENT ON THE OUTCOME OF THE TRIP.

9. B/1 ALSO SAID THAT KHOMEINI IS NOT PLEASED WITH IRAQ.
THIS DISPLEASURE IS BASED ON IRAQ'S COOPERATION WITH THE SHAH
OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS. KHOMEINI ALSO BELIEVES THAT THE
IRAQI SHIA' ARE THREATENED BY THE IRAQI REGIME.

10. WE WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE B/1 ATTEMPT TO SERVICE REF
REQUIREMENTS IN MORE DETAIL.

11. FILE: 221-946977. RVW 23 MAY 99 DRV E.O.1 ALL SECRET
S E C R E T

24 May 79 [illegible]

S E C R E T 24116Z MAY 79 STAFF

DIR BEIRUT 53957

FM DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN.

CONTEL ARLINGTON VA

REF: A. DIRECTOR 443665
B. BEIRUT 53949

(I GREATLY APPRECIATE PROMPT REPLY AND HEADQUARTERS PROPOSAL
TO LARGE/1 (B/1) FINANCIAL PROBLEMS. PLEASE AMEND B/1'S
TO REFLECT REF B PROPOSAL, WHICH BOTH STATION AND B/1
ACCEPTABLE.

2. B/1 TOLD US 4 MAY THAT HE HAS NOW BEEN ASKED TO RETURN
TEHRAN WITHIN TWENTY DAYS. OUR NEXT MEETING IS SCHEDULED
FOR 11 JUNE, AND B/1 WILL USE CALL IN EVENT IF HE LEAVES BEFORE
THAT TIME. HE WILL TRY TO CALL IN THREE OR FOUR DAYS PRIOR TO
DEPARTURE.

3. FILE: 221-946977. RVW 24 MAY 99 DRV E.O. ALL SECRET
S E C R E T

S E C R E T 110702Z AUG 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE WASHINGTON 493393, SECTION 1 OF 2.

TO: TEL AVIV INFO AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JERUSALEM, TEHRAN.

FM: NE/ISR INFO NE/ELJ, NE/EL, NE/PAL, NE/INTEL, NE/IRAQ, NIO/NESA, OPA/ME

SUBJECT: WNINTEL - MIDDLE EAST BRIEFING.

1. THE MIDDLE EAST BRIEFING WAS HELD AT HEADQUARTERS ON 9 AUGUST 1979 FOR MOSSAD REP ZEEV ALLON. LIAISON AGENDA YK/2A/836/79 WAS USED AS BASIS FOR THE BRIEFING.

2. PRIOR TO THE MEETING, C/NE/ISR EXPLAINED TO ALLON THAT WE WANTED TO OMIT DISCUSSING THE SECTION ON EGYPT AND UN RESOLUTION 242 AS THIS WAS A POLITICALLY SENSITIVE ISSUE BEING HANDLED AT HIGHER ECHELONS AND IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE FOR US TO COMMENT.

MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

3. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION PENDING FROM THE LAST MEETING ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN TURKEY, THE INFAC ANALYST SAID THAT THIS EXISTENCE CANNOT BE CONFIRMED. IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER, THE BROTHERHOOD'S POTENTIAL FOR EXISTENCE WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GOVERNMENT ITSELF AND THE NATIVE ALAWITE POPULATION IN TURKEY. THERE ARE RELIGIOUSLY CONSERVATIVE SUNNI ELEMENTS THAT WOULD LIKE THE BROTHERHOOD TO EXIST, HOWEVER, THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT IS A VERY FRAGILE ONE THAT DEPENDS ON HETERODOX ALEVI, WHICH ARE WHITE ORIENTED, FOR SUPPORT. IF THE PRESENT TURKEY GOVERNMENT WERE TO GIVE ASYLUM OR HINT OF ASYLUM TO THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD THE GOVERNMENT WOULD LOSE SUPPORT OF THE ALEVI GROUP. THE REASON THE ALEVI ARE SO SENSITIVE IS BECAUSE THE CURRENT STATE OF MARTIAL LAW WAS ACTUALLY SPARKED BY CLASHES BETWEEN FUNDAMENTALIST SUNNI EXTREMISTS AND THE ALEVI IN EASTERN TURKEY. SHOULD THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT IN TURKEY COLLAPSE AND SHOULD A MORE

CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT BE INSTALLED, THE CHANCES FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD ARE EQUALLY POOR BECAUSE OF THE MILITARY, WHICH IS A HIGHLY SECULAR FORCE AND WHICH WOULD RAISE BEHIND-THE-SCENES OBJECTIONS.

4. ACCORDING TO THE NFAC ANALYST, SYRIAN PRESIDENT ASSAD HAS FELT THAT THE CLASHES IN TURKEY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO SUNNI-ALAWITE TENSIONS IN SYRIA. THE ALEVI IN TURKEY AND THE ALAWITE FORM THE LARGEST NON-SUNNI ELEMENT. THIS ELEMENT IS VERY VISIBLE AND IS NOT LOST ON ASSAD. BOTH SYRIA AND TURKEY HAVE A SUNNI MAJORITY. THE NFAC ANALYST SAID THAT ANY UNOFFICIAL SHELTER THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD MIGHT FIND IN TURKEY EXISTS IN THE SOUTHERN PROVINCE AREA THAT BORDERS SYRIA DIRECTLY. SMUGGLERS LOCATED IN THIS AREA PROBABLY CONSIDER THEMSELVES NEITHER TURKS NOR SYRIANS AND WOULD LIKELY BE THE GROUP TO GIVE ASYLUM.

PLO

5. REGARDING LIAISON'S QUESTION ABOUT THE PLO'S INVOLVEMENT IN MOVES/FEELERS TO INTEGRATE INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE ANALYST SAID WE SEE CURRENT PLO INVOLVEMENT IN A BROADER CONTEXT. WE FEEL THE INITIATIVES AT THE UN AND IN WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED CHIEFLY BY ARAFAT, WHO HAS ACTED WITH VERY LITTLE CONSULTATION WITH OTHER PLO LEADERS. ONE OF ARAFAT'S GOALS IS TO HAVE AS MANY OPTIONS AS POSSIBLE DURING THE PEACE PROCESS. EVEN IF THE UN INITIATIVE IS ACCEPTED AND THE RESOLUTION IS PASSED, WE MAY NOT SEE ANY IMMEDIATE MOVES TO BECOME INVOLVED IN THE PEACE PROCESS. THERE ARE LIKELY OTHER ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED FIRST. ARAFAT'S VIEWS MAY DIFFER WITH THOSE OF OTHER PLO LEADERS, BUT WE WOULD HAVE TO WAIT UNTIL THIS RESOLUTION WERE ACTUALLY PASSED BEFORE WE COULD KNOW WHAT THE VIEWS ARE OF OTHER PLO OFFICIALS.

6. ON 11 AUGUST THE PLO CENTRAL COUNCIL WILL MEET. ACCORDING TO THE NFAC ANALYST, ARAFAT REALIZES THAT A PROPOSAL FOR PLO INVOLVEMENT IN PRESENT AUTONOMY TALKS WOULD SPLIT THE PLO. WE DO NOT THINK THIS WILL EVOLVE. WE THINK ARAFAT WANTS TO EXPLORE ALTERNATIVE WAYS OF ADVANCING PALESTINIAN POLITICAL RIGHTS SHOULD THE AUTONOMY TALKS NOT WORK OUT. ARAFAT'S GOALS ARE TO GAIN WIDE RECOGNITION AND INCREASED CONTACTS WITH THE

WEST. LOOKING BEYOND THE MAY DEADLINE FOR THE AUTONOMY TALKS, ARAFAT SEES TWO POSSIBLE OUTCOMES SHOULD THE TALKS FAIL TO GAIN AN ACCEPTABLE SETTLEMENT FOR THE PALESTINIANS: A) A STRONGER REJECTIONIST STANCE, DIRECTED ALSO AGAINST THE UNITED STATES AND B) ACQUIESENCE, WHICH WOULD MAKE ARAFAT APPEAR TO BE A WEAK LEADER WHO DID NOT DIRECT THE COURSE OF EVENTS. FOR THESE REASONS ARAFAT WANTS TO EXPLORE MEANS OF CONTINUING HIS INVOLVEMENT AND ENHANCING THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ACCEPTABLE NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT AT A FUTURE DATE. HENCE, ARAFAT'S EFFORTS TO GAIN U.S. RECOGNITION AND TO INCREASE CONTACTS WITH WEST EUROPEAN LEADERS.

7. AS FOR ACTIONS BEING TAKEN BY ORGANIZATIONS THAT OPPOSE ARAFAT'S INITIATIVES, THE NFAC ANALYST SAID THE STANCE OF OPPOSITION GROUPS DEALS NOT WITH CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS BUT WITH RESOLUTION BUILDING ON 242. REGARDING THE QUESTION OF WHAT OPPOSITION GROUPS WOULD JOIN WITH ARAFAT, THE NFAC ANALYST SAID THIS WOULD DEPEND ON WHAT CONCESSIONS WERE MADE BY THE WEST SHOULD ARAFAT ACCEPT RESOLUTION 242. SYRIA AND SAIQA WOULD BE THE KEY TO PLO ACCEPTANCE OF ARAFAT'S PROPOSAL ON 242. WITHOUT SYRIA AND SAIQA, ARAFAT WOULD NOT HAVE A MAJORITY. BUT IF SYRIA ACCEPTS, THE CHANCES ARE GOOD THAT THE UN RESOLUTION WOULD BE ACCEPTED BY THE PLO.

8. AS FOR THE MAXIMUM AND MINIMUM OBJECTIVES OF ARAFAT'S INITIATIVE, THE NFAC ANALYST SAID U.S. RECOGNITION--OR SOME DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE PLO--IS MAXIMUM. WITHIN THE UN, RECOGNITION OF PALESTINIAN RIGHT TO SELF DETERMINATION AND INDEPENDENT STATE IS MAXIMUM. RECOGNITION OF PALESTINIAN RIGHT TO SELF DETERMINATION IS MINIMUM. ANY WORDING MORE GENERAL THAN THIS WOULD MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR ARAFAT TO GAIN ACCEPTANCE AMONG THE PLO.

9. THE NFAC ANALYST SAID WE HAVE NOT SEEN MUCH REACTION AMONG THE PLO OR THE ARAB STATES IN REGARD TO THE UN INITIATIVE. THE BREAKDOWN, HOWEVER, WOULD BE LOGICAL: CONSERVATIVE STATES WOULD SEE IT AS BUILDING ON SOMETHING WORTHWHILE; BUT THERE WOULD BE A GREAT DEAL OF DEBATE OVER WORDING. IRAQ, WE WOULD IMAGINE, WOULD MAINTAIN ITS REJECTIONIST STANCE. AS FOR SYRIA THE WORDING WOULD BE CRUCIAL. IN EFFECT, THERE IS NO CHANCE

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OF IRAQI SUPPORT, BUT THERE IS A POSSIBILITY OF SYRIAN [illegible]
IN THE SENSE THAT SYRIA WOULD NOT ACTIVELY OPPOSE THE
INITIATIVE. WE THINK THE SOVIET UNION HAS REACTED [illegible]
TOWARD ARAFAT'S INITIATIVES AT THE UN AND IN WESTERN EUROPE.
THE SOVIETS WOULD FEAR THE PLO BEING DRAWN CLOSER TO THE
UNITED STATES AND THE EROSION OF THE ARAB BLOC THAT [illegible]
CAMP DAVID ACCORDS. ARAFAT WOULD LIKE TO GET ENOUGH [illegible]
TO CONTINUE INITIATIVES WITHOUT RISKING AN OUTRIGHT SPLIT
WITHIN PLO RANKS.

12. ALLON ASKED THE QUESTION OF WHO IS ARAFAT'S [illegible]
AT THE UN, AND THE NFAC ANALYST SAID MOST LIKELY IT IS [illegible]
KUWAIT IS SINCE THEY ARE ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL. ALLON [illegible]
IF THERE WERE CONTACTS BETWEEN THE PLO AND EGYPT ON THE [illegible]
THE NFAC ANALYST ANSWERED WE WOULD SUSPECT SO AT LEAST IN THE
FORM OF INFORMAL CONTACTS BUT THAT WE HONESTLY DON'T KNOW HOW FAR
UP THE ECHELONS THESE CONTACTS WENT.

IRAQ-SYRIA

11. REGARDING RECENT EVENTS IN IRAQ, THE NFAC ANALYST
SAID WE SEE THESE EVENTS AS A POLITICAL CONFRONTATION RATHER
THAN AS A COUP PLOT. THESE EVENTS HAVE ALREADY HAD A GOOD LINE
EFFECT ON IRAQI-SYRIAN RELATIONS. ACCORDING TO OUR INTERPRETATION
OF EVENTS, WE THINK THIS WILL BE SHORT TERM. A POLITICAL
CONFRONTATION WOULD BE A DOMESTIC PROBLEM, AND SYRIAN INVOLVEMENT
WOULD NOT BE A MAJOR ELEMENT. WHAT IS DIFFICULT TO DISCERN VIS-
IRAQI, AND SPECIFICALLY SADDAM HUSAYN'S PERCEPTION, UP TO
LAST OCTOBER, EACH COUNTRY WAS IN CONTACT WITH AND SUPPORTING
THE OPPOSITION GROUPS OF THE OTHER COUNTRY. OLD SUSPICIONS
DIE HARD, AND WE ASSUME HUSAYN SUSPECTS SYRIAN SUPPORT FOR
OPPOSITION GROUPS IN IRAQ. WE DO NOT BELIEVE ASSAD RECENTLY
HAS BEEN ACTIVELY SUPPORTING IRAQI DISSIDENCE. OUR LACK OF
SUCH EVIDENCE LEADS US TO BELIEVE THAT SUCH IRAQI-SYRIAN
SPONSORSHIP OF OPPOSITION ACTIVITIES AGAINST EACH OTHER CEASED
WITH THE RAPPROCHEMENT LAST FALL. THE REASONS THAT BROUGHT
SYRIA AND IRAQ TOGETHER LAST FALL STILL EXIST, BUT THIS LAST
INCIDENT INDICATES THE FRAGILITY OF THE RELATIONSHIP. THE
RESIDUE OF PAST ANIMOSITY IS STILL THERE. AN OPEN BREAK
BETWEEN THE TWO WILL NOT SERVE EITHER'S INTEREST, AND IRAQ

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SEEMS TO RECOGNIZE THIS BY REFUSING TO NAME THE FOREIGN ELEMENT
EVEN THOUGH EVERYONE ASSUMES THE UNIDENTIFIED FOREIGN ELEMENT
IS SYRIA.

12. THE NFAC ANALYST SAID IT IS TOO EARLY TO ASSESS THE
LONG-TERM IMPACT. AS FOR THE SHORT TERM, OUR ASSESSMENT IS:
AS LONG AS SERIOUS TENSION BETWEEN THE TWO EXISTS IT WILL BE
DIFFICULT TO ORGANIZE ANOTHER ARAB SUMMIT. THEREFORE,
CONCERTED ARAB ACTIONS FOR NEW MEASURES SUCH AS ADDITIONAL
SANCTIONS AGAINST EGYPT WILL BE UNLIKELY TO OCCUR. THERE
IS AN ARAB CONSENSUS, HOWEVER, ON CURRENT SANCTIONS. THERE IS
NOTHING TO STOP UNILATERAL EFFORTS TO MAKE ARAB MODERATES
HOLD THE LINE, AND THESE PROBABLY WOULD HAVE THE SAME NET EFFECT
CONCERTED PRESSURE.

13. IN THE MID-TERM, THE NFAC ANALYST SAID OUR TENTATIVE
ASSESSMENT IS THAT RECENT EVENTS IN IRAQ WILL HAVE LITTLE OR
NO EFFECT ON IRAQ'S INTER-ARAB POLICY. ALSO, EVENTS WILL HAVE
NO EFFECT ON SYRIA'S POLICY IN LEBANON AS THE REASONS FOR
STAYING OR WITHDRAWING DO NOT DERIVE FROM RELATIONS WITH IRAQ.
LIKEWISE WE FEEL EVENTS IN IRAQ WILL HAVE NO EFFECT ON SYRIA'S
ATTITUDE TOWARD THE POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS. EVEN THOUGH
RELATIONS WITH IRAQ ARE IMPORTANT FOR SYRIA, THE QUESTION OF
SYRIANS JOINING THE NEGOTIATIONS IS SO IMPORTANT THAT SYRIA
WOULD ACT WHEN IT WAS RIGHT FOR SYRIA--REGARDLESS OF IRAQI
OBJECTIVES.

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S E C R E T Ø2Ø9 SEP 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 541Ø

TO: IMMEDIATEBEIR DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL MJBARGE INTEL

REF: BEIRUT 5488Ø

1. IN ADDITION TO REQUIREMENTS ALREADY FURNISHED , WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN AN IN MJBARGE/1 HAS OF GAN ACQUIRE ON THE SOCIALIST WORKERS' PARTY, OME TWELVE OF WHOSE ALLEGED MEMBERS HAVE BEEN SENTENCED T DEATH IN AHVAZ. DOES THE PARTY HAVE ANY PALESTINIAN--P RHA S FLP--CONNECTIONS? WHAT ARE ITS CURRENT MEMBERSHIP, OBJECTIVES AND ACTIVITIES?

2. WE HAVE HEARD THAT O OFFICE IN AHVAZ WAS CLOSED CIRCA NID-JULY. CAN B/1 CONFIR AN PROVIDE CIRCUMSTANCES OF CLOSURE? ANY CHANGE OFFICE WILL RE P N

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S E C R E T

Note: This is a typed text of a shredded document which was reconstructed; the reason being its opacity which makes it unfit for printing purposes. Between-the-letters' space in dicates that the shreds were either incomplete or they were fully un intelligible.



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[illegible]ITE BEIRUT 54363

TO: DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN, LONDON.

[illegible]NINTEL INTEL PEERFORT

1. PEERFORT/1 HAS PASSED US INFORMATION WHICH HE OBTAINED [illegible]ON HANNA BUR F I D I OF PHALANGE PARTY G-2 CONCERNING THE [illegible]RAINING OF IRANIANS IN SOUTHERN LEBANON BY PALESTINIANS. ACCORDING TO BREIDI, A MESSENGER FROM MAJOR SAAD H A D D A D, LEADER OF THE RIGHTIST MILITIAS IN SOUTH LEBANON, TOLD THE LEBANESE FRONT'S MILITARY COUNCIL ON 19 AUGUST THAT 150 IRANIANS ARE BEING TRAINED NEAR THE LITANI RIVER BY FATAH. THE IRANIANS WERE DESCRIBED ONLY AS BEING PRO-KHOMEINI.

2. WE HAVE REPEATEDLY QUERIED MJBARGE/1, MJMARTYR/1 AND MJBRIDGE/1 ABOUT PALESTINIAN TRAINING OF IRANIANS IN LEBANON. ALL THREE DENY THAT ANY SUCH TRAINING IS GOING ON. MJBARGE/1 AND MJMARTYR/1 ARE CERTAINLY IN A POSITION TO BE KNOWLEDGABLE OF ANY FATAH TRAINING, AND THEY HAVE NOT YET BEEN RELUCTANT TO SUPPLY US WITH ANY INFORMATION ON IRAN, OR ON FATAH TRAINING OF OTHER GROUPS. MJBRIDGE/1 TRAVELS TWICE A WEEK TO SOUTHERN LEBANON, AND HE SAYS THAT ALL TRAINING SITES IN THE SOUTH HAVE BEEN CLOSED BECAUSE OF THE ISRAELI SHELLING AND BOMBING CAMPAIGN THERE, WHICH HAS BEEN CONTINUAL SINCE APRIL. MJBRIDGE/1 SAYS THAT IF ANY TRAINING OF IRANIANS IS GOING ON IT WOULD HAVE TO BE CONDUCTED IN SYRIA OR IN NORTHERN LEBANON (THE BIQA' VALLEY FOR INSTANCE) AS IT IS NOT CURRENTLY FEASIBLE IN THE SOUTH.

3. FRANKLY, WE DOUBT THAT PARA 1 INFORMATION IS TRUE.

4. PARA 1 MAY BE PASSED TO GNGRAPH.

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BEIRUT 54565

DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN.

TEL MJBARGE

REF: A. TEHRAN 54680
B. BEIRUT 54490
C. DIRECTOR 475714

1. AT [illegible] SEPTEMBER MEETING, MJMARTYR/1 INFORMED US THAT [illegible]
MJBARGE/1 WAS IN LIBYA REPRESENTING FATAH AT A MEETING OF [illegible]
REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL. BECAUSE OF THIS, WE COULD [illegible]
GO OVER WITH MJBARGE/1 HIS WRITTEN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS [illegible]
REF C. IN ORDER NOT TO WASTE ANY MORE TIME IN [illegible]
THAT MJBARGE/1 WILL BE ABLE TO ELABORATE ON HIS ANSWERS [illegible]
WE FORWARDING HIS RESPONSES BY OPS CABLE LATER TODAY.

2. AT MEETING, MJMARTYR/1 ALSO PASSED ON [illegible]
ADDITIONAL WRITTEN REPORTS ON EVENTS IN IRAN WHICH MJBARGE/1 [illegible]
HAD PREPARED PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE FOR LIBYA. WE ARE NOW [illegible]
FORWARDING THESE IN OPS FORMAT.

3. MJMARTYR/1 SAYS THAT MJBARGE/1 STILL EXPECTS TO TRAVEL [illegible]
TO TEHRAN UPON HIS RETURN FROM LIBYA. WE PASSED ON REQUIREMENT [illegible]
IN REF A FOR MJMARTYR/1 TO GIVE TO MJBARGE/1.

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FM BEIRUT 5[illegible] SECTION 1 OF 2

TO: DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN

INFO TEL (NFD) MJBARGE

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 475714
B. BEIRUT 54490
C. BEIRUT 54565

1. THE FOLLOWING IN MJBARGE/1'S (P/1) WRITTEN RESPONSE TO SOME OF THE QUESTIONS POSED IN REF.

2. POLITICAL DYNAMICS:

A. DECISIONS IN IRAN ARE MADE BY AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI, AFTER CONSULTATION WITH AYATOLLAH MONTAZARI AND OTHER AYATOLLAHS IN KHOMEINI'S INNER CIRCLE. KHOMEINI IS CONSIDERED TO BE THE SPIRITUAL FATHER OF THE STATE, AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN KHOMEINI AND THE STATE IS FOR THE STATE TO IMPLEMENT DECISIONS WHICH KHOMEINI HAS MADE. THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL IS DIRECTLY UNDER KHOMEINI IN AUTHORITY AND PARTICIPATES IN THE DECISION MAKING. THE STATE DOES NOT HAVE DECISION-MAKING POWER; IT ONLY EXISTS TO IMPLEMENT THE DECISIONS MADE BY KHOMEINI AND THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL.

B. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN KHOMEINI AND PRIME MINISTER MEHDI BAZARGAN IS LUKEWARM AT TIMES, BECAUSE OF DISAGREEMENT ON SOME POINTS, AND IS GOOD AT OTHER TIMES. IN GENERAL, THE RELATIONSHIP COULD BE DESCRIBED AS "NOT BAD". THE POINTS OF DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN KHOMEINI AND BAZARGAN ARE:

(1) THE INTERVENTION OF THE "RELIGIOUS MEN" IN ALL AFFAIRS, LARGE AND SMALL.

(2) BAZARGAN'S OPPOSITION TO THE EXECUTIONS, WHICH WAS A RESULT OF CONTINUED PROSECUTIONS BY THE "RELIGIOUS MEN".

(3) THE PRACTICES (NFI) OF ELEMENTS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS.

(4) KHOMEINI'S INSISTENCE THAT THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL ARE THE ORGANIZATION RESPONSIBLE FOR INTERNAL SECURITY.

(5) KHOMEINI'S PRO-PALESTINIAN STANCE, HIS ATTITUDE TO THE MIDDLE EAST, AND HIS STAND ON EGYPT.

(6) THE SITUATION IN THE ARMY AND THE REORGANIZATION THEREOF. BAZARGAN HAS ONE OPINION AND KHOMEINI ANOTHER.

(7) THE SEVERE DECISIONS MADE BY KHOMEINI, WHICH BAZARGAN CONSIDERS, TO A CERTAIN EXTENT, REACTIONARY.

C. THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL HAS ITS HEADQUARTERS AT QUM, BUT THE CENTER OF ITS ACTIVITY IS IN TEHRAN. IT HAS A PRESENCE IN ALL REGIONS IN IRAN. IT IS COMPOSED OF AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF PERSONS, BUT A NUMBER SUFFICIENT TO COVER ALL THE REGIONS. IT IS HEADED BY KHOMEINI. OTHER RANKING MEMBERS ARE: AYATOLLAH MONTAZARI, AYATOLLAH (? AL-TLYS ?), AHMAD AL-KHOMEINI, AYATOLLAH KHALKHALI, ESHRAFI (PROBABLY ESHRAQI), COLONEL (HAMID) NAMJU, ABU AHMAD MONTAZARI, AND OTHERS WHOSE NAMES ARE NOT KNOWN. THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL MEETS AS NECESSARY. ONE MEETING A MONTH IS HELD WITH KHOMEINI PRESENT.

3. KHOMEINI:

A. KHOMEINI'S PERMANENT BASE IS IN QUM. HE IS USUALLY FOUND IN THE SCHOOL (MADRASAH). HE IS WELL GUARDED, AND HIS GUARDS ARE WELL TRAINED. A LARGE PORTION OF THESE GUARDS ARE FORMER AIR FORCE PERSONNEL. THERE IS A BUREAU OF ADMINISTRATION, A SECURITY OFFICE AND A COMPLAINTS OFFICE.

B. KHOMEINI IS ACCOMPANIED BY HIS SON AHMAD AT ALL TIMES. OTHER PERSONS USUALLY WITH KHOMEINI ARE: MALEKUNI (SIC), MONTAZARI, BEHESHTI, AND ESHRAFI (ESHRAQI ?). THERE ARE ALSO OTHERS WITH HIM.

C. THE FEDAYEEN-E-ISLAM ARE A VERY EXTREMIST SECT. KHALKHALI HAS A VERY STRONG RELATIONSHIP TO THEM, AND COULD BE THEIR

LEADER. THEIR AIM IS TO LIQUIDATE EVERY ONE WHO HAD WORKED WITH THE SHAH, AND TO INSIST ON GETTING KHOMEINI TO MAKE "MORE POSITIVE DECISIONS". THEIR NUMBER IS NOT LARGE.

D. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN KHOMEINI AND SHARIAT-MADARI IS "NOT GOOD". THEY DIFFER A LOT IN THEIR VIEWPOINTS.

E. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN KHOMEINI AND MARASHI-NAJAFI IS "NOT BAD".

F. EVERY AYATOLLAH HAS HIS OWN BASE, WHERE HE RESIDES, AND HIS OWN MADRASAH (SCHOOL), HIS OWN PUPILS, SUPPORTERS AND OPINIONS. EACH HAS HIS OWN PERSONAL GUARDS. THERE IS HOSTILITY BETWEEN THE VARIOUS GROUPS OF GUARDS, BUT IT IS WELL HIDDEN AND NOT READILY APPARENT.

G. KHOMEINI SEES OFFICIAL DELEGATIONS AND OFFICIAL VISITORS IN SMALL MEETINGS. HOWEVER, PRIOR APPROVAL MUST BE OBTAINED AND AN APPOINTMENT MADE.

H. KHOMEINI'S HEALTH IS "NOT BAD". HE IS 79 YEARS OLD.

I. IF KHOMEINI WERE TO SUDDENLY DIE, IT WOULD BE A STRONG SHOCK TO THE PEOPLE AND TO THE REVOLUTION. HE WOULD, HOWEVER, NOT BE SUCCEEDED BY ANY ONE PERSON. THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL WOULD TAKE OVER FOR KHOMEINI, AND THE REVOLUTION WOULD CONTINUE IN ITS PRESENT COURSE. THOSE WHO WOULD PLAY THE PRINCIPLE ROLE WOULD BE: AYATOLLAH MONTAZARI, AYATOLLAH TALEGHANI, AHMAD AL-KHOMEINI, KHALKHALI, AND ESHRAFI (ESHRAQI?).

J. THE BASE (SIC) OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS IS IN QUM. THEY ARE TRAINED BY FORMER MEMBERS OF THE IRANIAN ARMED FORCES.

4. OPPOSITION TO KHOMEINI:

A. SHARIAT-MADARI IS VERY CLOSE TO BAZARGAN AND IS DISTANT FROM KHOMEINI. SHARIAT-MADARI IS AN ASTUTE POLITICIAN, AND A MAN OF LAW AND THEOLOGY. THERE IS NOT BIG DANGER TO THE GOVERNMENT FROM SHARIAT-MADARI BECAUSE HE FEARS CONFRONTATION. HE DOES NOT LIKE ADVENTURE (SIC) AND IS NOT RADICAL.

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...E. TALEGHANI IS NOT A LEFTIST, BUT HE IS SYMPATHETIC WITH ...E LEFT. HIS CHILDREN ARE MEMBERS OF LEFTIST ORGANIZATIONS. ...E LEFT IS EXPLOITING THE STANDS OF TALEGHANI.

C. THERE ARE MOVEMENTS AROUND THE BAZAARI LEADERSHIP (NFI), ...T THEY ALL CONVERGE INTO KHOMEINI'S POSITIONS.

6. ACTIVITIES AND PLANS AGAINST THE REVOLUTION DO NOT ...EYOND DEMONSTRATIONS, THE DISTRIBUTION OF TRACTS, AND SOM... ...CASIONAL ASSASSINATIONS.

...E. THE IRANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (TUDEH) IS MAKING NUMEROUS ...AN COMPLICATED EFFORTS. THEY ARE INFILTRATING TUDEH PERSONNEL ...INTO ALL LEFTIST ORGANIZATIONS AS WELL AS INTO THE RANKS OF ...THE WORKERS AND STUDENTS. THEY ARE ALSO INFILTRATING INTO THE ...MINORITIES, ESPECIALLY THE KURDS AND THE ARABS, AND INTO THE ...RANKS OF THE ARMY, WHERE THEY ARE CONCENTRATING ON SOWING ...DISCONTENT AMONG AND RECRUITING OFFICERS AND NCO'S. TUDEH IS ...DELVING ITSELF WITH ALL LEFTIST GROUPS, WHEREVER THE OPPORTUNITY ...ARISES. TUDEH'S ATTITUDES AND AIMS ARE MANY, THE MOST IMPORTANT ...BEING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CURRENT SITUATION TO A POINT WHERE ...IRAN OPENLY SIDES WITH THE INTERNATIONAL LEFT AND THE SOVIET ...UNION. TUDEH MEMBERS ARE BEING TRAINED ON ALL TYPES OF WEAPONS, ...ESPECIALLY THOSE FROM THE EASTERN BLOC. AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF ...TUDEH MEMBERS ARE TRAINING OUTSIDE IRAN IN SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. ...THEY MAINTAIN SECRET COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE PARTY IN IRAN ...THROUGH EMBASSIES IN TEHRAN AND ACROSS THE IRAQI AND AFGHANI ...BORDERS.

5. THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES:

A. THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES ARE THE BRIDGING CONNECTION ...BETWEEN THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL AND THE PEOPLE. THE COMMITTEES ...CONTROL AND DIRECT THE SECURITY AFFAIRS IN IRAN AND HELP TO ...SOLVE THE PROBLEMS OF THE PEOPLE.

B. THERE IS NO HIERARCHY OF COMMITTEES. THE RELATIONSHIP ...BETWEEN DIFFERENT COMMITTEES IS A MATTER OF COORDINATION. EACH ...COMMITTEE IS TIED TO THE PRINCIPLE COMMITTEE IN TEHRAN, THROUGH ...WHICH ALL THE COMMITTEES ARE TIED TO QUM.

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...C. PART OF EACH COMMITTEE IS MADE UP OF FULL TIME MEMBERS. ...THESE RECEIVE A MONTHLY SALARY. ALL THE COMMITTEE HEADS ...TIED TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE IN TEHRAN, AND THROUGH IT ...CAN COMMUNICATE WITH KHOMEINI AFTER GOING THROUGH THE ...REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL. ALL THE EXISTING REVOLUTIONARY ...COMMITTEES ARE ULTIMATELY LINKED WITH KHOMEINI.

...D. KHOMEINI, DESPITE MANY UNPOPULAR DECISIONS, STILL REMAINS ...THE STRONGEST FACTOR INFLUENCING THE IRANIAN MASSES. DIFFERENCES ...BETWEEN COMMITTEES ARE SUPERFICIAL AND DO NOT REACH FUNDAMENTAL ...LEVELS. IN SPITE OF THE PRACTICES (NFI) OF SOME INDIVIDUALS ...TO STIR UP TROUBLE, THESE INDIVIDUALS INCLUDE FORMER AGENTS OF SA... ...AND OF THE LEFT, AND THEY EXAGGERATE THE SIZE OF MISTAKES AND ...EXPLOIT PROBLEMS IN ORDER TO CREATE PROBLEMS FOR THE REVOLUTIO... ...(COMMENT: THE BANNING OF DEMONSTRATIONS IS A PRELIMINARY STEP ...TOWARD THE DOMESTICATION (SIC) OF THE LEFT IN IRAN.)

6. DEFER TO HEADQUARTERS FOR ANY DISSEMINATION.

7. FILES: DEFER. RVW 4 SEP 99 DEA DOC.1 ALL SECRET

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CITE BEIRUT 54567

TO: DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN

WNINTEL INTEL MJBARGE

REF: BEIRUT 54565

1. MJMARTYR/1 PASSED US THE FOLLOWING WRITTEN REPORT FROM MJBARGE/1 ON IRAN IN LATE AUGUST.

2. FOLLOWING THE RECENT ELECTIONS AND THE TRIUMPH OF THE PRO-KHOMEINI CANDIDATES, THE OPPOSITION FORCES, REPRESENTED THE LEFT, THE TUDEH PARTY, SOME MEMBERS OF THE INTELLIGENTSIA AND THE PRO-SHARIAT+MADARI ELEMENTS (WHICH ARE BACKED BY SOME POLITICIANS, INCLUDING BAZARGAN WHO HAS YET TO FACE AN OPEN ST MADE VIOLENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN IRAN. THE FORCES WHICH MANIPULATED THESE DEMONSTRATIONS ALSO COORDINATED WITH THE KUR AND URGED THEM TO MOVE. THEIR OBJECTIVE WAS TO STRIKE THE AUL AUTHORITY AND TO WEAKEN IT, PARTICULARLY KHOMEINI, WHO IS STILL CONSIDERED TO BE THE DOMINANT FORCE IN IRAN.

3. AS A RESULT OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS, KHOMEINI MOVED QUICKL AND ORDERED THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS TO CONFRONT THE DEMONSTRAT AND THE KURDS. THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS THEN ATTACKED THE OFFI OF THE LEFT IN TEHRAN, WHICH ARE CONSIDERED TO BE THE PRIMARY CENTERS OF DISSENT AGAINST THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION. IN THESE OFFICES, THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS CONFISCATED TRACTS, PAINTING PRESSES AND WEAPONS. ORDERS WERE THEN ISSUED FORBIDDING DEMONSTRATIONS AND INSTRUCTING THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS TO CONFRONT ANY DEMONSTRATIONS WITH VIOLENCE.

4. KHOMEINI ALSO INSTRUCTED THE ARMY TO LIQUIDATE THE KURDIS REBELLION "AT ANY PRICE". THE BORDERS WITH IRAQ WERE CLOSED TO PREVENT ANYONE FLEEING IRAN FROM ENTERING THAT COUNTRY, AS WELL AS TO PREVENT ARMS FROM BEING SMUGGLED TO THE KURDS BY IRAQ (NIC

5. FATAH'S ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION IN IRAN IS THAT

KHOMEINI REMAINS THE STRONGEST FACTOR IN IRAN, AND THAT HE CRUSH THE REBELLION, AS WELL AS THE LEFT IF IT PERSISTS IN BEING A CAUSE OF ANNOYANCE TO HIM. FATAH ALSO BELIEVES THAT KHOMEINI WILL CALL UPON THE SHIA' POPULATION OF IRAQ TO MOVE AGAINST THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT IF IRAQ PERSISTS IN BACKING THE KURDS. THE REBELLION IN SANANDAJ WILL ALSO BE CRUSHED. HE IS FEARFUL OF MOVES BY THE ARAB MINORITY IN ARABISTAN, BUT FATAH ESTIMATES THAT KHOMEINI STILL ENJOYS VAST POPULARITY WITH THE MASSES WHICH WILL ENABLE HIM TO STAND AGAINST ALL PLOTS AND EVENTS.

6. AT THE SAME TIME HE PASSED US THE REPORT CONTAINING PA 2-5, MJMARTYR/1 ALSO PASSED US ANOTHER WRITTEN REPORT CONTAIN THE FOLLOWING TID-BITS ON IRAN:

A. A NEW ORGANIZATION NAMED ASSAR YAWAD 17 TAL ZA'TAR HA BEEN FORMED BY ELEMENTS THAT WERE FORMERLY IN AN IRANIAN REJECTION FRONT WHICH LATER JOINED WITH TUDEH. IT IS THE ORGANIZATION WHICH CARRIES OUT TERRORIST OPERATIONS, VIOLENCE, ASSASSINATIONS, AND WHICH LATELY TRIED TO MURDER THE REVOLUTIO PUBLIC ATTORNEY.

B. THERE IS WRATH AND CONDEMNATION BY THE MEN OF THE REVO BY THE PUBLISHERS AGAINST THE REVOLUTIONARY PUBLIC ATTORNEY HAJATOLISLAM 'ALI K A D H U S, WHO IS CLOSING THE NEWSPAPERS A THE MAGAZINES. HE WILL PROBABLY BE ASSASSINATED.

C. THE EDUCATED CLASS IS PRO-SHARIAT+MADARI. THEY ALSO FAVOR BAKTIAR. THIS GROUP, HOWEVER, WILL NOT TAKE ANY POSITIVE ACTION. RATHER IT WILL REMAIN PASSIVE. IT IS HEADED BY SHARIAT MADARI, WHO DOES NOT BELIEVE IN VIOLENCE AS A WAY TO SOLVE THINGS.

D. THE COMMANDER OF THE IRANIAN AIR FORCE HAS BEEN RECENTLY REPLACED BY A PRO-KHOMEINI GENERAL. (NFI).

E. MANY ELEMENTS FROM AFGHANISTAN ARE BEING TRAINED I QZVIN, NORTH OF TEHRAN, BY CADRES AND EXPERTS FROM THE IRANIAN ARMY WHO WERE FORMERLY IN THE PALESTINIAN REVOLUTION (S THESE EXPERTS INCLUDE GUEVERA, ABU SHARAF, ABU AL-QASIM AN

PAGE 3 BEIRUT 54567 S E C R E T
OTHERS.

F. ALSO, IN ALL THE REGIONS OF IRAN, JUNIOR OFFICERS FR
THE IRANIAN ARMY ARE TRAINING ELEMENTS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY
GUARDS. ONLY A SMALL NUMBER OF PALESTINIAN INSTRUCTORS REMAI
IN IRAN, BUT, MJBARGE/1 THINKS THEIR NUMBER WILL INCREASE SOO

G. THE SITUATION IN AHWAZ IS NOT STABLE AND COULD DETERIO
THIS COMMENT WAS MADE BY MAJOR MUHAMMAD T H A B I T, THE DEPU
CHARGE OF THE PLO OFFICE IN AHWAZ.

7. DEFER TO HEADQUARTERS FOR ANY DISSEMINATION.

8. INDEX HABIT.

9. FILE: DEFER. RVW 6 SEP 99 DRV DOC.1 ALL SECRET
S E C R E T
BT
#4567

6 SEP 79 16 05Z

S E C R E T 0608552 SEP 79 STAFF

CITE BEIRUT 54372

TO: DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN.

WHINFIL, INTEL, MJBARGE

REF: BEIRUT 54265

1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE TRANSLATION OF THE REPORT ON IRAN FROM MJBARGE/1 WHICH MJHANTR/1 PASSED TO US ON 3 SEPTEMBER.

2. ACCORDING TO INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO FATAH, IRAQ IS SUPPORTING THE KURDISH REBELS IN KURDISTAN IN THE LATTER'S FIGHT TO GAIN AUTONOMY. NOT ONLY IS SADDAM HUSAYN DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN SUPERVISING THE CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS, BUT IRAQ HAS RELEASED (SIC) HIGH RANK AND OTHER OFFICERS AND ASSIGNED THEM TO WORK WITH THE KURDISH REBELS. ALSO, JUNIOR OFFICERS HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED TO LEAD THE KURDISH TROOPS.

3. AYATOLLAH RUHOLLAH AL-K H O M E I N I HAS SENT OUT A GENERAL CALL TO CRUSH THE REBELS, AND THE IRANIAN ARMY AND THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS ENTERED MOST OF THE KURDISH AREA, TIGHTENING THE ROPE AROUND THE NECK OF THE KURDS". A GREAT NUMBER OF KURDS WERE KILLED AND WOUNDED AND THERE WERE NUMEROUS EXECUTIONS. THE REMAINDER OF THE REBELS HAVE FLED TO THE MOUNTAINS AND OTHER DIFFICULT TO GET TO AREAS FROM WHICH THEY WILL WAGE A GUERRILLA WAR BACKED BY IRAQ.

4. IN ORDER TO SAVE THE REST OF THE KURDS, SOME OF THEIR "WISE MEN" AND RELIGIOUS LEADERS CONTACTED AYATOLLAH TALEGHANI, WHO, IN TURN, CONTACTED KHOMEINI. AS A RESULT OF THESE CONTACTS, A SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF HIGH-LEVEL PERSONAGES WHO ARE CLOSE TO KHOMEINI WAS DISPATCHED TO THE AREA OF THE FIGHTING. THIS COMMITTEE WAS ABLE TO CALM CONDITIONS IN THE AREA WITH THE PROMISE THAT KURDISH CLAIMS WILL BE REVIEWED PROMPTLY AFTER ALL FIGHTING HAS FULLY CEASED.

PAGE 2 BEIRUT 54572 S E C R E T

3. THE AYATOLLAHS M O N T A Z A R I, K H A L K H A L I, T A B T A B A ' I (SIC), AND ESHRAFI (SIC) PLAYED A PRINCIPLE ROLE IN CALMING THE SITUATION IN KURDISTAN. HOWEVER, KHOMEINI REAFFIRMED (BY HIS ACTIONS) THAT HE IS THE STRONGEST MAN IN IRAN AND THE PRINCIPLE LEADER. HE ALONE CAN PLAY WITH ALL THE CARDS WITHOUT FEAR (SIC).

6. BUT THE LEFTIST FORCES LED BY TUDEH AND THE FEDAYEEN KHALQ IRAN ARE SETTING IN ORDER THEIR MILITARY AND ORGANIZATIONAL AFFAIRS. THIS IS BEING DONE IN SECRET, AND THEY ARE NOW GOING UNDERGROUND FOR FEAR OF BEING HIT AND LIQUIDATED BY KHOMEINI.

7. THERE ARE MANY CHANGES (NFI) THAT WILL TAKE PLACE IN THE ARMY AND ON THE CIVIL AND GOVERNMENTAL LEVELS. THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND EXPECTS SOME PROBLEMS IN ARABISTAN AND BELIEVES THAT IRAQ WILL ALSO BE "NOURISHING" THESE EVENTS. HOWEVER, THE SITUATION IN IRAN STILL REQUIRES WORK BASED ON A STUDY OF THE SITUATION AND CAREFUL PROGRAMMING FOR THE FUTURE BECAUSE THINGS ARE STILL SHROUDED WITH VAGUENESS.

8. THE SITUATION OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) IN IRAN IS VERY GOOD, AND RELATIONS WITH THE COMMAND IN QUM ARE VERY STRONG. THE LAST LETTER (NFI) FROM (PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN YASIR) A R A F A T TO KHOMEINI HAD A VERY GOOD EFFECT AND HELPED TO CALM THE SITUATION IN KURDISTAN. THE MEETING OF THE PLO'S REPRESENTATIVE WITH TALEGHANI AND THEN WITH KHOMEINI HELPED A GREAT DEAL TO HALT THE FIGHTING AND WAS MET WITH SATISFACTION FROM THE KURDISH SIDE. THEREFORE THE PLO IS ABLE TO PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE CURRENT EVENTS IN IRAN AND IS ABLE TO MAKE FAIL (SIC) THE "PLOTS OF THE PLOTTERS WHO CONSTANTLY WORK TO STRIKE THE IRANIAN AND PALESTINIAN REVOLUTION".

9. ALSO, FATAH HAS RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

A. SHARIAT-MADARI IS CONDUCTING INTENSIVE CONTACTS WITH ALL THE FORCES WHICH ARE INVOLVED WITH THE EVENTS AND WHICH ARE NOT WITH KHOMEINI.

B. (FORMER PRIME MINISTER) BAKHTIAR IS IN CONTACT WITH

PAGE 3 BEIRUT 54572 S E C R E T

SHARIAT-MADARI AND THEY ARE COORDINATING THEIR ACTIONS. THEY ALSO COMMUNICATE WITH SOME ARMY ELEMENTS (NFI).

FATAH, HOWEVER, ESTIMATES THAT KHOMEINI KNOWS ABOUT "THESE THINGS" (A AND B), AND SHALL CRUSH THEM BEFORE THEY MOVE. FATAH BELIEVES THIS BECAUSE IN TALKING TO FATAH REPRESENTATIVES (NFI) IN MID-AUGUST KHALKHALI SAID, "WE SHALL FINISH WITH THE KURDS BUT OTHER PROBLEMS WILL EMERGE. THIS HAS BEEN TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, AND WE SHALL CRUSH ANY CONSPIRACY AND EVERY CONSPIRATOR WHEN HE WAS ASKED ABOUT BIKHTIAR'S RENEWED ACTIVITY, KHALKHALI SAID THAT BIKHTIAR, "ONLY POSSESSES HIS TONGUE, AND HE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO DO ANYTHING BECAUSE THE MAJORITY OF THE IRANIAN PEOPLE ARE WITH THE REVOLUTION".

10. DEFER TO DIRECTOR FOR ANY DISSEMINATION.

11. FILES DEFER. RVW 6 SEP 99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET

E C R E T

11 SEP 79 1?5Z

S E C R E T 110750Z SEP 79 STAFF

CIT BEIRUT 54606

TO: DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN, TRIPOLI.

NI TEL INTEL MJBARGE

1. IN VERY BRIEF CAR MEETING WITH MJBARGE/1 (B/1) NIGHT OF 10 SEPTEMBER, B/1 TOLD US THAT HE WILL LEAVE FOR TEHRAN ON 12 SEPTEMBER. HE EXPECTS TO RETURN TO BEIRUT IN EARLY OCTOBER. BEFORE RETURNING TO BEIRUT, B/1 WILL TRAVEL TO PDRY AND SPAIN.

2. B/1 HAD JUST RETURNED FROM LIBYA. WHILE THERE HE SAID HE WAS STRUCK BY THE AMOUNT OF ADVANCED WEAPONRY HE SAW. HE SAYS HE PERSONALLY SAW NINE MIG-27'S, AS WELL AS NUMEROUS MIG-25'S AND 23'S, PLUS MISSILES (NFI) AND LARGE AMOUNTS OF T-72 TANKS. ADDITIONALLY, B/1 WAS AMAZED AT THE AMOUNT OF CUBANS HE SAW IN LIBYA. WHEN PRESSED FOR A NUMBER HE COULD ONLY SAY, "MANY, MANY." HE SAID THAT THERE WERE BOTH ADVISORS AND CUBAN MILITARY "UNITS" PRESENT. THE CUBANS ARE HEAVILY INVOLVED IN TRAINING AFRICANS IN LIBYA. B/1 SAYS THAT HE WAS TOLD BY THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE LIBYAN ARMED FORCES THAT 30,000 AFRICANS WERE IN LIBYA UNDERGOING MILITARY TRAINING. THESE INCLUDED PERSONS FROM UGANDA, CHAD, ZIMBABWE, SPANISH SAHARA, AND THE CENTRAL AFRICAN EMPIRE, B/1 SAID.

3. B/1 ALSO TOLD US THAT FATAH NOW HAS 25 IRANIANS IN LEBANON BEING TRAINED AT THE BURJ AL-BARAJNAH COMMANDO TRAINING FACILITY. THESE IRANIANS WERE ACCOMPANIED BY KHOMEINI'S COMPANION (RAFIQ) HUSSEIN MUNTAZAR (NOT RELATED TO THE AYATOLLAH OF THE SAME NAME.) MUNTAZAR, WHO ACCORDING TO B/1 WAS IN PARIS WITH KHOMEINI AND IS VERY CLOSE TO THE AYATOLLAH, TOLD B/1 THAT KHOMEINI HAS DECIDED THAT PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN WILL HAVE TO GO. WE HAVE NO MORE DETAILS AT THIS POINT.

4. FILE: 201-946977. RVW 11 SEP 99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET
SE R E T

12 Sep 79 [illegible] 40Z

E [illegible] SEP 79 STAFF

[illegible] 54662

[illegible] TEHRAN,

[illegible] MBARGE [illegible] RIYR

[illegible] 46[illegible]

[illegible] INFORMED US EVENING 11 SEPTEMBER THAT [illegible] WOULD LEAVE FOR TEHRAN ON 12 SEPTEMBER. MJBARGE/1 [illegible] ACCOMPANIED BY BRIGADIER SAID S A Y [illegible] L ABU WALID), [illegible] AF'S [illegible] MILITARY) OPERATIONS ROOM. THEY SHOULD REMAIN [illegible] A WEEK [illegible] TEN DAYS.

[illegible] ALSO PASSED US WRITTEN REPORTS FROM MJBARGE/1 [illegible] TRIP TO LIBYA AND ON IRAN. [illegible] ARE HAVING THESE [illegible]

[illegible] E: 201-946977. RVW 12 SEP 99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET
[illegible] T

20 Sep 79

E C R E T 200820Z SEP 79 STAFF

IE BEIRUT 54688

O: TEHRAN INFO DIRECTOR, TRIPOLI.

NINTEL MJBARGE INTEL

EF: TEHRAN 54236

1. WILL DO OUR BEST TO PROVIDE MORE PRECISE IDENTIFICATI
OF "MUNTAZAR". HOWEVER, CASE OFFICER WHO OBTAINED INFO FROM
MJBARGE/1 (B/I) WILL BE ABSENT FROM STATION UNTIL CA. 15 OC
DURING THIS PERIOD WE MAY NOT HAVE AN PERSONAL MEETINGS WI
B/I DEPENDING UPON SEVERAL FACTORS, INCLUDING B/I'S RELUCTA
TO MEET WITH A TLY C/O DURING THIS MONTH. OUR
REQUIREMENTS FOR B/I WILL BE PASSED IN WRITING VIA MJMARTYR
NEXT MEETING WITH MJMARTYR/1 IS SCHEDULED FOR 24 SEP. WILL
ADVISE.

2. NO FILE: RYW 20 SEP 79 DRV D96.1 ALL SECRET

S E C R E T

OCT

4 OCT 79 STAFF

54236
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54743

FILE DEFER

11 OCT 79

S E C R E T 1Ø173ØZ OCT 79 STAFF

CITE BEIRUT 54836

TO: DIRECTOR, TEHRAN.

WNINTEL INTEL SDVALID

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 528725
B. TEHRAN 544Ø7

1. IF ESFAHANI OF REFS HAS ARRIVED LEBANON SINCE 1 OCT HE HAS KEPT VERY LOW PROFILE. TO BEST OUR KNOWLEDGE THERE HAS BEEN NO PRESS COVERAGE OF HIS GREAT EMINENCE. QUERIED MJBRIDGE/1 AT 1Ø OCT MEETING AND HE HAD NOT HEARD OF ESFAHANI. MJBRIDGE/1 WILL CHECK TO ENSURE WE NOT MISSING OUT ON VISIT.

2. THERE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE PRESS COVERAGE FOR VISIT OF DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER DR. SADEQ TABATABA'I, WHO ARRIVED IN LEBANON ON 7 OCT AND DEPARTED ON 9 OCT. WE HAVE TASKED APPROPRIATE ASSETS TO REPORT ANY SIGNIFICANT NON-PUBLIC DEVELOPMENTS RE THIS VISIT, AND WE'LL PROVIDE RESULTS TO ADDEES IF OBTAINED.

3. PLS ADVISE IF SUMMARY OF TABATABA'I'S PUBLIC ACTIVITIES HERE WOULD BE OF ANY ASSISTANCE.

4. NO FILE. RVW 1Ø OCT 99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T

[redacted]

WHAT STATION CONSIDE[redacted]
WHENEVER POSSIBLE IT BE SE[redacted]
CONSIDERABLE DELAY IN DISSEMINATING [redacted]
AND ALL TOO OFTEN IT ULTIMATELY IS NOT DISSE[redacted]
THE COMMUNITY BUT IS SIMPLY RELEASED TO NFAC FOR [redacted]
SUGGEST STATION CONTINUE TO ZRWAHOO ALL B/1 REPORTS FOR HEAD[redacted]
REVIEW OF OTHER COUNTRY CONTENT.

2. HAVE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON REF:

RE PARA SIX: ALTHOUGH THE PGOI HAS MADE CLEAR ITS INTENTION OF SPREADING THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY PRINCIPLES AS WIDELY AS POSSIBLE, AND ALTHOUGH LIBYAN LEADER MU'AMMAR QADHAFI IS ALSO VERY INTERESTED IN THE PROPAGATION OF ISLAMIC IDEOLOGY, [redacted] NO INFORMATION TO CONFIRM THE ALLEGATION THAT LIBYA AND IRAN HAVE ENTERED INTO A "FINDING COOPERATION" TO SPREAD MUSLIM IDEAS, NOR CAN WE VERIFY THAT SUCH AN AGREEMENT WAS THE PURPOSE OF MOHAMMAD MONTAZERI'S EARLY JULY 1979 VISIT TO LIBYA. IN FACT, ACCORDING TO TRIPOLI EMBTEL 1277 DATED 5 JULY 1979, "MONTAZERI TALKED AT LENGTH, BUT SAID LITTLE OF SUBSTANCE".

RE PARA NINE: WE [redacted] HEARING RUMORS OF THE IRANIANS ALSO [redacted]

[redacted]

WHOSE NAME APPEARS IN [redacted]

3. INFORMATION ON IRANIAN SCIENTIST [redacted] OCR WAS ESPECIALLY APPRECIATIVE FOR THE INFORMATION ON CHAMRAM. ANY ADDITIONAL BIO ON HIM WOULD BE APPRECIATED.

4. WITH B/1'S ESTABLISHED ACCESS TO SENIOR RELIGIOUS FIGURES INCLUDING AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI, SUGGEST STATION SELECT APPROPRIATE REQUIREMENTS FROM FOLLOWING, WHICH UPDATED BY NFAC:

A. WHAT IS THE CURRENT STATE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN KHOMEINI AND SHARIAT-MADARI? WILL SHARIAT-MADARI MORE ACTIVELY SUPPORT A MODERATE OPPOSITION GROUP NOW THAT ARTICLE V OF THE CONSTITUTION APPEARS TO INSTITUTIONALIZE CLERICAL LEADERSHIP OF THE GOVERNMENT? WITH WHOM IN THE MOSLEM PEOPLES ISLAMIC REPUBLIC PARTY DOES SHARIAT-MADARI WORK? IS SHARIAT-MADARI IN CONTACT WITH BAKHTIAR? WHAT DOES HE THINK OF BAKHTIAR'S ACTIVITIES?

B. WHAT WAS THE EFFECT OF TALAQANI'S DEATH ON THE CLERICAL COMMUNITY? ARE THERE MORE OPEN CONFLICTS NOW BETWEEN THE SENIOR QOM AYATOLLAHS (SHARIAT-MADARI, GOLPAYGANI, MARASHI-NAJAFI) AND KHOMEINI'S CAMP? WHAT WAS

[redacted]

FOLLOWERS NOW INTEND TO [redacted] NEW ISLAMIC REPUBLIC BY ENSURING THAT THEY ARE IN THE MAJORITY IN GOVERNMENT [redacted] POSITIONS SUCH AS THE MAJLES AND THE PRESIDENCY. IF THEY DETERMINED TO FORCE THE MORE SECULAR, MODERATE PRAGMATISTS (LIKE BAZIR) OUT OF THE GOVERNMENT AND RUN THEMSELVES? IF SO, HOW DO THE SENIOR CLERICAL LEADERS SUCH AS SHARIAT-MADARI PLAN TO RESPOND?

E. WHAT KIND OF PRESSURE HAS KHOMEINI PUT ON OTHER CLERICAL LEADERS? WHAT, FOR EXAMPLE, ACCOUNTS FOR THE CHANGE IN TALAQANI'S POSITION BEFORE HIS DEATH?

F. IS KHOMEINI DELIBERATELY TRYING TO CONVINCE PEOPLE THAT HE IS THE IMAM ZAMAN?

5. REQUEST STATION RESUBMIT REF A IN INTEL FORMAT, WITH ANY CLARIFICATION/AMPLIFICATION MJMARCYR/1 ABLE PROVIDE AT 19 OCTOBER MEETING.

6. FILE 221-046077. WWW 120CT79 DRV DOC.1 ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T

PI

#2325

[redacted]

25 Oct 79 07 54Z

S E C R E T 250643Z OCT 79 INTEL

CITE BEIRUT 54965 ZNY XXXXX

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO AMMAN, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, TEHRAN.

WNINTEL INTEL MJBARGE

SUPDATA: ZRWAHOO FOR APPROVAL OF OMISSION OF PLACE ACQUIRED, AND APPROVAL OF SOURCE DESCRIPTION. OPACT: ARBLEAT. SOURCE: MJBARGE/). SEE BEIRUT 5495A WHICH DOES NOT AFFECT DISSEM. (UNILATERAL). BANASCO OBTAINED OD: D-1 NO LIAISON. NO INDEX: DEFER TO DIRECTOR FOR MILITARY DISSEM. CL BY: 038464. FIELD NO.: NLB-18,692. FILE: DEFER.

FILED: 250643Z

REPORT CLASS SECRET--WNINTEL--NOFORN--NO CONTRACT--ORCON EXCLUSIVE DISSEMINATION TO ADDRESSEES LISTED IN FINAL PARAGRAPH

COUNTRY: IRAN

SUBJECT: COMMENTS OF AYATOLLAH RUHOLLAH KHOMEINI ON TRANSFER OF ADVANCED WEAPONS SYSTEMS FROM IRAN TO ARAB COUNTRIES (DOI: LATE SEPTEMBER 1979)

SOURCE: AN ARAB MILITARY OFFICER WHOSE PAST REPORTING ON OTHER AREAS HAS OFTEN BEEN SUBSTANTIATED. HE HAD ACCESS TO THE INFORMATION REPORTED.

1. IN LATE SEPTEMBER, SUBSEQUENT TO THE 24 SEPTEMBER AIR BATTLE OVER LEBANON BETWEEN SYRIAN AND ISRAELI AIRCRAFT, IRANIAN RELIGIOUS LEADER AYATOLLAH RUHOLLAH K H O M E I N I COMMENTED ON THE POSSIBLE TRANSFER OF ADVANCED AIRCRAFT, INCLUDING THE U.S. MANUFACTURED F-14S AND F-16S, FROM IRAN TO SYRIA OR OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES CONFRONTING ISRAEL. KHOMEINI SAID THAT THE TRANSFER OF SUCH AIRCRAFT COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED SO LONG AS THE KURDISH PROBLEM CONTINUED IN IRAN, BECAUSE IRAN ITSELF NEEDED THE AIRCRAFT. KHOMEINI ADDED THAT ONCE THE KURDISH PROBLEM WAS DISPENSED WITH, HOWEVER, THEN HE WOULD "THINK ABOUT" SUCH A TRANSFER OF AIRCRAFT. KHOMEINI ALSO SAID THAT IF THE AIRCRAFT WERE TRANSFERRED, THE MOVE WOULD ALSO INCLUDE PILOTS, GROUND SUPPORT AND MAINTENCE PERSONNEL.

2. ACQ: (24 OCTOBER 1979)

3. FIELD DISSEM: SENT TO AMMAN, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, TEHRAN (FOR CHIEF OF MISSION, DEFENSE ATTACHE ONLY)

4. WASHINGTON DISSEM:

TO STATE EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR, INR
TO DIA EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR, DIA

REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE--INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS--



EXTRACTION AND DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR.
RVW 25 OCT 99 DRV DSC.1 BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER.
ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.



DURING OUR 29 OCTOBER
HIM ABOUT IRANIAN AID TO
SPECIFICS, HE SAID THAT
INIANS WITH SOME WEAPONS
, MINES AND EXPLOSIVES.
AS NOT PLANNING TO PROVIDE FATAH WITH
S, SUCH AS TANKS, PERSONNEL CARRIERS O
ID THAT NO HEAVY ARTILLERY WOULD BE PROVIDED.
H HAD A GOOD SUPPLY OF WEAPONS AND THAT ALL
D UP ITS MUNITIONS STOCKS. HE ALSO
IN FATAH WAS TRAINED ON WESTERN WEAPONS,
FOR
HE PALES
OCT 99 DRV DSC.1 ALL SECRET

S E C R E T 311357Z OCT 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE TEHRAN 54635

TO: WASHINGTON INFO BEIRUT.

FOR: C/NE/IRAN INFO C/NE/SLJ

SUBJECT: WNINTEL INTEL -- PLO DELEGATION TO IRAN

1. COMPLETE LIST OF NAMES OF MID-OCTOBER PLO DELEGATION TO IRAN WAS NEVER PUBLISHED HERE. SDTRAMP/1 PROVIDED THE LIST ON 29 OCTOBER; IT IS FORWARDED FOR THE RECORD.

ABU J E H A D, SECOND IN COMMAND TO ARAFAT.

ABU W A L I D, DESCRIBED AS MEMBER OF MILITARY OPERATIONS BUREAU OF "THE PALESTINIAN REVOLUTION."

SAKHAR ABU N A Z A R, DESCRIBED AS MEMBER OF THE DIRECTORY BOARD OF FATAH RESPONSIBLE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SOUTH LEBANON.

COLONEL FAKHR AL H U S S E I N I, DESCRIBED AS A COMMANDER IN SAIQA.

HANI A L - H A S S A N, PLO REP IN TEHRAN.

2. T/1 SAID THE WAFA CORRESPONDENT IN TEHRAN TOLD HIM THAT KHOMEINI HAD BEEN HELPFUL IN PROVIDING FINANCIAL HELP TO THE PLO (NFI).

3. NO FILE. RVW 31OCT99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T

2 Nov 79 11 39z

S E C R E T 01229?Z NOV 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 544529.

TO: BEIRUT INFO TEHRAN.

WNINTEL MJBARGE INTEL

REF: NLB-18,692 BEIRUT 54965

1. WISH CONGRATULATE BANASCO ON OBTAINING REF REPORT. IT IS ON A SUBJECT OF HIGH INTEREST AND WAS VERY TIMELY. THE REPORT WAS USED IN THE DCI MORNING NOTES, IN A MEMORANDUM TO THE DIRECTOR OF NFAC, AND IN A PDB ANNEX. IT WILL BE GRADED A "10". NEEDLESS TO SAY, WELCOME CONTINUED REPORTING ON THIS TOPIC.

2. FILE: 201-946977. RVW 01NOV99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T
ET
#0342

1

TDFIRDB-315/18[illegible]-7

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. DIST: 1 NOVEMBER 197[illegible]
REPORT CLASS SECRET--WINTEL--NOFORN--NOCONTRACT--ORCON
COUNTRY: IRAN/LIBYA/ARAB STATES
SUBJECT: OBSERVATIONS ON THE SITUATION IN IRAN (DOI: MID-[illegible] SEPTEMBER 1979)
SOURCE: A NON-IRANIAN MILITARY OFFICER WHOSE PAST REPORTING ON OTHER AREAS HAS BEEN GENERALLY SUBSTANTIATED. HE OBTAINED THE INFORMATION FROM CONVERSATIONS WITH [illegible] IRANIAN OFFICIALS AND FROM PERSONAL OBSERVATION.

1. THE DOMESTIC SITUATION IN IRAN IS NOT AS UNSETTLED AS THE OPPOSITION MEDIA DESCRIBE IT. SECURITY IN THE COUNTRY IS ESTABLISHED, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF KURDISTAN. THE IRANIAN BELIEVE THAT THE UNREST THERE IS THE RESULT OF THE SUPPORT [illegible] PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSAYN FOR THE KURDS. THE IRANIAN CONSIDER HIM THE SOLE AGITATOR OF THE KURDISH SITUATION.

2. SOME IRANIANS HAVE COMMENTED THAT MANY IRANIAN [illegible] MENT OFFICIALS MAY BE REPLACED IN THE NEAR FUTURE, AND PRIME MINISTER MEHDI BAZARGAN MAY BE AMONG THEM. THESE IRANIAN EXPECT THE CHANGE IN IRAN TO CHANGE SOMEWHAT, BUT THE CHANGE WILL REFLECT THE BEST INTERESTS OF AYATOLLAH RUHOLLAH KHOMEINI WHO IS THE STRONGEST MAN IN IRAN. ONE IRANIAN OFFICIAL COMMENTED THAT IN RECENT WEEKS, THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT HAS LEARNED A [illegible] SURPRISING THINGS. THEREFORE, THE IRANIANS EXPECT THAT THE COMING MONTHS WILL BE THORNY AND DIFFICULT BUT THAT ULTIMATELY, THE MASSES AND THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT WILL BENEFIT.

3. IRANIAN OFFICIALS EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER A CONNECTION BETWEEN FORMER PRIME MINISTER SHAHPOUR BAKHTIAR, AYATOLLAH MAZEM SADEGHI AFT-MADARI AND THE RADICAL LAWYERS GUILD, OF WHICH FORMER NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY CHAIRMAN HASSAN NAZIH IS A MEMBER. THE IRANIANS ARE INTENT ON EXAMINING THIS CONNECTION AND HAVE ALREADY STARTED ACTION TO DO SO. THE IRANIANS ARE ALSO INTENT ON ERADICATING THE COMMUNIST PRESENCE IN IRAN AND OTHER MUSLIM COUNTRIES.

4. THE IRANIANS ARE HARD AT WORK PURGING THE ARMY AND [illegible]-



[illegible] THE NEW DEFENSE MINISTER, DR. MUSTAFA [illegible]
ORGANIZING IT. THE NEW DEFENSE MINISTER WAS PREVIOUSLY IN THE U.S.
A CIVILIAN WHO [illegible] HE IS MARRIED AND HAS CHILDREN. CHAMRAN WENT TO LEBANON IN 1972 AND JOINED IMAM MUSA SADR'S FOLLOWING. HE APPOINTED AS A MILITARY OFFICIAL IN SADR'S AMAL AND STAYED WITH THE GUERRILLAS UNTIL THE VICTORY OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION AND CONTRIBUTED TO THE VICTORY. HE WAS ALSO A TEACHER IN A SCHOOL IN TYRE WHILE IN LEBANON. THE IRANIANS CONSIDER HIM TO BE SMART, TRUSTFUL AND HIGH MORAL STANDARDS. HE IS ABOUT 47 YEARS OLD AND TALL, TANNED AND COMPLIMENTS. HE [illegible] MUCH IS EXPECTED OF HIS PERFORMANCE WITH THE PARTIAL BALD. ARMY IF CONDITIONS PERMIT AND TIME ALLOWS.

5. THE IRANIANS CONSIDER LIBYA TO BE AN ARSENAL OF WEAPONS. THERE ARE [illegible] OF THE PRESENCE IN LIBYA OF CUBANS, SOVIETS, BULGARIANS, [illegible] TURKS AND OTHER NATIONALITIES, WITH THE CUBANS AND SOVIETS IN THE MAJORITY. ALSO IN LIBYA ARMS BEING NUMBERS OF AFRICANS AND [illegible] COMMENCING TO THEIR OWN COUNTRIES (HEADQUARTERS [illegible] RETURNING TO THEIR OWN COUNTRIES FOR MILITARY TRAINING FOR PALESTINIANS AND LIBYANS. ALSO PROVIDE MILITARY TRAINING FOR PALESTINIANS AND OSSIBLE SOUTH AMERICANS AND EUROPEANS. THERE ARE [illegible] MILITARY PERSONNEL THERE, OF WHOM [illegible] ARE CUBANS. THERE ARE [illegible] APPROXIMATELY 300 CUBAN MEDICAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL [illegible] NUMBER OF CUBAN CONSTRUCTION WORKERS MAY BE ARRIVING [illegible] FUTURE. THERE ARE ALSO MANY PAKISTANI, ITALIAN AND [illegible] ADVISORY PERSONNEL IN LIBYA.)

6. [illegible] (17 OCTOBER 1979)

7. FIELD DISSEM: SENT TO AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JERUSALEM, JIDDA, KUWAIT, TEHRAN, TEL AVIV, KABUL, TRIPOLI, [illegible] SOURCES AND [illegible]

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